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THE INCIDENCE
OF MENTAL DISORDER
MSGR. MARION J. REINHARDT*
N APRIL 16, 1970 at Niagara Falls, New York, at the convention
of the Eastern Regional Conference of the Canon Law Society of
America, we read a paper entitled, "Essential Incompatibility as Grounds
for Nullity of Marriage."' The thesis was based on well known canon-
ical principles. No one could oblige himself or be obliged to do the
impossible. The impossibility could be rooted in the psychic as well as
in the physical. Permanence is an essential property of marriage. To
these principles we added that to exchange permanent rights with each
other, husband and wife must be able to lead some "common life" to-
gether. They must at least be able to lead the minimum conjugal life
together, i.e. to engage in marital intercourse in a truly human fashion.
Later Ann6, in a celebrated Rotal Decision, published November 10,
1970 (but decided on February 25, 1969) spoke of a basic capacity
for the community of conjugal life as being necessary for a valid mar-
riage contract.2
In the paper on essential incompatibility we spoke of a "constitu-
tional incapacity," signifying an inability based radically in the structure
of the personality, not so much in the genes as in the environmental
development of the personality. We concluded that two persons, relative
to each other, could be so constituted in their personalities, that they
were psychically incapable of leading a common life together. We pre-
t A paper read at the Fifth Annual Spring Conference of the Canon Law So-
ciety of Great Britain on May 17, 1972 at Myddelton Lodge, Ilkey, Leeds,
England.
* S.T.B. 1939, Gregorian University, Rome; J.C.D. 1949, Catholic University of
America; LL.B. 1963, St. John's University; Presiding and Administrative Judge
of the Diocese of Brooklyn; admitted to practice before New York and Federal
courts including the Supreme Court of the United States.
1 16 CATHOLIC LAWYER 173 (1970).
2 S.R.R. Decisio, Marianopolitana, coram Ann6, 25 February 1969, cf. Epheme-
rides Iuris Canonici, An. xxvi, 419-22 (1970).
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sumed that "such incompatibles" singly
considered, might have the power of due
discretion to bind themselves to the contract
although relative to each other they could
not fulfill the essential terms of the con-
tract. We suggested psychological testing
in depth to establish such relative constitu-
tional incapacity to fulfill.
The historical origin of this paper is the
following experience of the Brooklyn Tri-
bunal. In almost every case where the
parties claimed that they were unable to
continue common life together because they
were incompatible and where they were also
willing to undergo psychological testing in
depth,3 the tests revealed some severe psy-
chopathology in one or both of the parties
. . . such psychopathology as to severely
interfere with the power of due discretion
in the area of marriage ... such a condition
from which the court could find the mar-
riage null and void from the lack of consent
on the part of one or both of the parties.
These were our consistent findings from
the results of testing in from two to three
hundred cases. In other words, the priest-
attorneys pleading before our court, search-
ing for proof of a relative incapacity of
bride and groom to live together in a
permanent and human fashion, found that
they did not have to argue their cases on a
relative incapacity, but that, if the parties
cooperated sufficiently, there was generally
sufficient evidence to prove that at least one
3 The psychological tests usually administered
were: Wechsler Adult Intelligence, Bender Visual
Motor Gestalt, Figure Drawing, Word Asso-
ciation, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality In-
ventory, Sentence Completion, Thematic Apper-
ception, Rorschach Examination and Marriage
Adjustment Inventories.
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party alone lacked the capacity to marry at
the time of the marriage.
We were deeply surprised at the findings
which resulted from psychological testing
and from clinical studies by psychiatrists.
Actually, if we had a sufficient background
in psychology and psychiatry, we should
not have been. Some of the experts, who
had helped us prepare the paper on in-
compatibility and who appeared frequently
before our court, had warned us about this.
Dr. Frederic L. Gannon had said, "I would
seriously doubt that the individual parties
possess sufficient power of discretion if it
does result in incompatibility." Dr. Walter
J. Coville, a clinical psychologist, stated
that "if the fact is accepted that the basis
for essential incompatibility may be rooted
deeply in the unconscious aspects of per-
sonality, then it follows that these uncon-
scious and compelling forces do in fact
impair due discretion to bind oneself to the
marriage contract because all the facts are
not available to the consciously functioning
judgment of the couple." Dr. William S.
Davis, psychiatrist, asked whether the fact
that two essentially incompatible people
contract marriage indicates that one or
both lacked that degree of due discretion
necessary to contract marriage, answered
that in his estimation one of the partners
lacked the due discretion necessary to bind
himself to a contract as serious as marriage.
Dr. Pasquale D. Lotesta, psychiatrist, also
affirmed that the very fact that a married
couple is incompatible indicates that one or
both lacked that degree of due discretion
necessary for a valid contract. Dr. Edward
F. Falsey, psychiatrist, asserted that the
fact that two people are essentially incom-
patible does strongly suggest that one or
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both lacked that degree of discretion neces-
sary to bind oneself to a contract as serious
as marriage.
The psychiatrists who appear before the
Brooklyn Tribunal are not unique in their
opinions. Doctors Dorothea C. Leighton
and Alexander H. Leighton, writing in the
Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry,
testify that "there is a popular idea that
there must be something wrong with one or
both of the parties who break up a mar-
riage."' 4 Jaco made a study of psychotic
subjects in Texas and he found that the
annual incidence rates of psychotic subjects
were highest for the divorced, followed by
rates for the single, the separated, the
widowed, and finally for the married.5
Doctors Srole and Langner have found in
the so-called "Midtown Study" conducted
in New York that the divorced of both
sexes have the highest mental morbidity
rate of all the four marital status cate-
gories. The incidence of impairment among
the divorced was twice as high as that
among the married between the ages of 30
and 49.6 The Doctors Leighton conclude
that the "Midtown Study" shows that di-
vorce and poor mental health are closely
associated. 7
Returning to our own experience in the
Tribunal of Brooklyn, I wish to say imme-
diately that not all of those whom we found
4 FREEDMAN & KAPLAN, COMPREHENSIVE TEXT-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1530 (1967) [hereinafter
FREEDMAN & KAPLAN].
5 RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, THE SOCIAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDERS 122-23
(1960).
6 L. SROLE, MENTAL HEALTH IN METROPOLIS, THE
MIDTOWN MANHATTAN STUDY 185 (1962).
7 FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN, supra note 4, at 1530.
lacking in the necessary judgmental capac-
ity to contract marriage were suffering
from psychosis. Among those who found
their marriages to be unlivable and who
were willing to cooperate in our psy-
chological and psychiatric examinations,
psychosis was found to be present in ap-
proximately one-third of the cases. In the
remaining cases of unsuccessful marriages
that were examined, the cause of the
break-up was found in the so-called "per-
sonality disorder." The personality disorder
not only had made the continuance of
common life impossible, but as we have
been assured by our psychiatric experts
that those inflicted with such disorders in
general also lacked the judgmental capac-
ity to enter marriage. This incapacity re-
sulted not from the fact that they were
insane-because they were not psychotic
-but from the fact that the personality
disorder itself prevented them from recog-
nizing certain essential facts about them-
selves, and frequently about the other party,
which were necessary to make a prudent
judgment about the advisability of marriage.
First of all, what are these personality
disorders which were found in approxi-
mately two-thirds of the marriage cases
presented for our adjudication? According
to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders,8 published by the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, personality
disorders are characterized by deeply
ingrained maladaptive patterns of behavior
that are perceptively different in quality
8 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Dir,-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter MENTAL
DISORDERS].
from psychotic and neurotic symptoms.
Generally, these are life-long patterns, often
recognizable at the time of adolescence or
earlier.
Dr. Norman Cameron of the Institute
of Human Relations, Yale University,
states that in the personality disorders some
distortion of the personality develops early
in life and persists as a person's style, as
a characteristic way in which he copes with
his environment and defends himself. Per-
sons with such disorders must live in ac-
cordance with their fixed patterns of behav-
ior. There is unquestioning conformity.
Everyone adopts certain habits of behavior,
but the individual who achieves normal,
effective adulthood is able to adapt his
behavior to meet the demands of changing
circumstances. When conformity to a fixed
pattern of behavior is a must from which
one cannot deviate in spite of the fact that
circumstances would warrant otherwise,
there is present a personality disorder
rather than a simple personality habit or
trait. 9
Among the more common personality
disorders listed by the American Psychiatric
Association in their Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders are the
following: paranoid personality, cyclothy-
mic personality, schizoid personality, ob-
sessive-compulsive personality, hysterical
personality, passive-aggressive personality,
anti-social personality, inadequate per-
sonality, sexual deviation and alcoholism. 10
9 N. CAMERON, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT
AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, A DYNAMIC APPROACH
638 (1963).
10 MENTAL DISORDERS at 9-10.
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Confronted with so many unhappy mar-
riges where psychological testing has shown
that one or both of the parties were suffer-
ing from a personality disorder, we asked
Dr. Francis C. Bauer, a psychiatric expert
who has been appearing before our Court
for twenty years, to explain the effect of
such pathology on the contractual ability
of a party entering marriage. I quote now
from Dr. Bauer:
The building up of the personality is a
matter of control by the conscious mind
of the fundamental urges of the uncon-
scious. Through inhibiting activity, various
asocial urges are hindered and the demands
of social adjustment are met. The domesti-
cation of aggressive and certain sexual
strivines makes for social serviceability.
The devastating effect of personality dis-
orders is the individual's lack of awareness
of the defect. Since the psychopathology is
not known to the individual, he is unable
to compensate at the conscious level. The
disorder constitutes a blind spot in the
mental apparatus.
The youngster confronted simultane-
ously with a bright, shiny penny and a well
worn dollar bill will inevitably choose the
former. His reaction is predictable and is
based on his lack of capacity to know the
intrinsic value of either object. But he does
not know that this knowledge is relevant
and he thinks that he is making a free
choice. He is unaware of the fact that his
choice is not free, but really determined
entirely by the superficially attractive as-
pects of the object of his selection.
In similar fashion, the schizoid person-
ality does not know that he is narcissistic
and self-absorbed as a result of which he
is unable to sustain the close interpersonal
relationship and the intimate sharing of
the emotional life demanded in marriage.
Nor can he know that these demands will
disturb his life adjustment, upset his equi-
librium and cause him great discomfort af-
ter he enters the married state. He does
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not even suspect that whatever love he
can generate he must redirect toward him-
self because of his personality disorder and
that there will be no love available to di-
rect toward his spouse. Accordingly, he is
attracted by the ideas of marriage and re-
inforced by the attitude of society toward
that institution. He also experiences the
physical attraction of the opposite sex and
is encouraged by the love directed toward
his partner. Like the shiny penny, his re-
action is predictable. Lacking all of the
information necessary to make a rational
decision, however, his choice is inevitable,
not free.
In the case of the antisocial and inade-
quate personality disorders, we are faced
with similar situations. Such individuals
have not the slightest intimation that their
personalities are in any way defective. They
cannot know that they are unresponsive to
the value system of their society by virtue
of disordered personalities. They are not
aware of their chronic disregard for the
consequences of their behavior. They, in
fact, perceive themselves as normal, mature
individuals. When the harsh intrusion of
reality makes them aware of the inade-
quacy of their behavior, they are truly
surprised. Usually they project responsibil-
ity for the difficulties they have caused
onto others or onto some institution of
society or vaguely to "the system."
Lacking the capacity to develop guilt
feelings, which anxiety makes people re-
sponsive to ethical norms, people with this
type of psychopathology are blissfully un-
concerned about the consequences of their
behavior and lack a sense of responsibility.
Emotionally they are not impressed with
rewards for good behavior or punishment
for bad. But they are unaware of their in-
capacities. For these reasons then they can-
not be said to judge freely since they are
in all matters not choosing between alter-
natives but reflexively behaving according
to the pleasure principle.
These conditions are difficult to compre-
hend because such individuals seem to be
deliberately and purposefully flaunting the
traditions of society and breaking its laws
in a malicious and willful manner. But
they are not. The essence of the personality
disorder is that they cannot act otherwise.
What Dr. Bauer has stated about the
schizoid, anti-social, and inadequate per-
sonalities can be said in general of all of the
personality disorders. They lack insight
into their personal incapacities to lead a
married life. Did you ever try to convince a
person addicted to alcohol or to drugs of
the severity of his affliction? Even if some-
what convinced, he is still unaware of the
basic personality disorder, usually passive-
aggressive, which led him to abuse of
alcohol or drugs. The homosexual also
might have some knowledge of his devia-
tion, but when we examine the motives
which prompted him to marry, we must
admit that they are far from reasonable.
Dr. Bauer's analysis of the personality
disorder indicates two legal approaches to
the invalidity of a marriage. Both of these
are centered on the "lack of due dis-
cretion." In the first instance he argues that
personality disorders cause "blind spots"
which make it impossible for those afflicted
to know or to acknowledge their incapac-
ities in regard to the essential obligations of
marriage. In these cases the principle of
"caveat emptor" does not apply because
the personality disorder itself blinds the
contractant to his disabilities. Very fre-
quently the personality disorder causes the
person afflicted to wrongly judge the other
contractant. Our jurisprudence holds that
all anomalies of the personality which
seriously interfere with the power of un-
derstanding and the power of judgment
could cause invalidity. These very same
anomalies which cause the contractants to
lack the necessary information also cause,
according to our experts, married life to be
unbearable.
Dr. Bauer also argues from the point of
free volition. Those suffering from per-
sonality disorders frequently do not make
a free choice either in entering marriage or
in choosing a suitable mate. Again our
canonical jurisprudence holds that to enter
a valid marriage one must be able to freely
choose, for reasonable motives, whether he
wishes to marry and with whom he wishes
to marry. If the marriage in question is
predetermined by reason of an incapac-
itating personality disorder, freedom of
choice could be lacking and nullity would
result.
There is a third ground for nullity im-
plied in the argument of Dr. Bauer. Be-
cause of the rigidity of the manner of acting
caused by a personality disorder, the per-
sonality disorder itself most frequently
causes the failure of the marriage, i.e.,
causes common life to be impossible. If
the court can honestly find this to be the
case, it would be justified in finding for
nullity because no one can be obliged to do
the impossible.
In this third case, where we consider the
personality disorder as the true cause of
the failure of the marriage, one is con-
fronted with the difficulty that the inability
to fulfill must be perpetual. If the disorder
is curable, it is not perpetual.
Concerning the curability of a personal-
ity disorder one must also study the in-
dividual case, but in general one must not
be over-optimistic in finding such a condi-
tion curable. Dr. Norman Cameron of Yale
University states: "If a person with a
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character disorder seeks therapeutic help,
it is because he has for some reason be-
come dissatisfied with the way he is or-
ganized, or with the way he operates, and
because he hopes through therapy to ac-
quire a different, happier, and more effec-
tive way of living. Nowadays it is this hope
that motivates a large percentage of pa-
tients who turn to psychotherapy and
psychoanalysis. This hope is an ambitious
one. It implies the possibility of making
fundamental changes in a personality or-
ganization that has determined the patient's
very style of life, perhaps from childhood.
Sometimes such a hope can be fulfilled;
more often it cannot. If a patient's hope
can be so modified that he expects improve-
ment rather than a radical change, his
chances of reaching his goal will be greatly
increased and the chances of therapeutic
disillusionment may be correspondingly
lessened."11
Dr. Eugene B. Brody and Dr. Lindbergh
S. Sata of the University of Maryland
stated that "[Plersonality-disordered pa-
tients place perhaps the greatest demands
on psychotherapists. The rewards for con-
tinued, devoted work with such patients
have been relatively small to date. The
tendency for the therapist to become an-
noyed, discouraged, or preoccupied with
his own therapeutic impotence is great."'1 2
There is also danger in therapy for per-
sonality disorders. Dr. Cameron states,
"[in entering upon the treatment of per-
sonality or character disorders one must
11 N. CAMERON, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT
AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, A DYNAMIC APPROACH
640 (1963).
12 Cf. FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN at 939.
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bear in mind the risk of a psychotic re-
gression resulting from therapeutic dis-
turbance of the pathological equilibrium.
Effective psychotherapy and psychoanalysis
often involve risks, as surgical interference
does. The therapist who takes such inevita-
ble risks into account is not to be blamed
if, in spite of all reasonable precaution,
they materialize in the course of therapy.
• . . No psychotherapist or psychoanalyst
opens up the old conflicts, crystallized in
personality distortion, without endangering
his patient's equilibrium; but without this
danger there can be no effective psycho-
therapy or psychoanalysis."' 13
I do not wish to give the impression that
once the court is confronted with a diag-
nosis of a personality disorder, it can im-
mediately declare the marriage null and
void. We are more or less accustomed to
do this in the case of schizophrenia as long
as we are satisfied that the illness existed in
a "full blown" condition before the mar-
riage. On the other hand, questioning by
the court as to the severity of the disorder,
its incapacitating effect on the marital life,
the patient's knowledge of the condition, its
effect on the intellectual, volitional, and
judgmental aspects of the consent, will
frequently lead the court to moral certitude
that there could have been no true marital
consent or that one or both of the parties
was incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligation of marriage, especially that of
permanence. For this, psychological testing
13 N. CAMERON, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT
AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, A DYNAMIC APPROACH,
641-42. Cf. Bauer, "The Problem of Change
in Therapy," PROCEEDINGS OF THE MENTAL
HEALTH INSTITUTE ON PSYCHOTHERAPY 19-28
(1965).
in depth is of great assistance to the psy-
chiatrist who advises the court. The man-
ner of interrogating the medical expert is
also helpful: Did you find psychopathol-
ogy? Was it severe? Did it affect the
understanding of marriage, the will, the
judgment? Was the psychopathology
the substantial cause of the consent? "But
for" the psychopathology, would the dis-
ordered person have married this person,
at this time? Was the condition reasonably
curable considering the therapy available
and the person's motivations, financial
status and usual place of residence? How
much therapy would be required? Was
there reasonable hope of success? Was
there danger in therapy? How much
danger?
The question is immediately raised as to
the percentage of cases which are successful
on the grounds of a personality disorder.
Without giving exact numbers-because I
cannot-I must say that it is very high-at
least ninety per cent of the cases argued
on these grounds are successful. The lack
of success more frequently is caused by a
lack of cooperation of one or both of the
parties. Success many times depends on the
psychological tests, because only too fre-
quently clinical observations by a psy-
chiatrist cannot detect the severity of the
disorder. Sometimes clinical observation
alone is sufficient. All experts appearing
before our court agree that these per-
sonality disorders can be more disruptive
of marital life than neuroses and psychoses.
The internal necessity to act in a definite,
positive manner without regard for the
changing circumstances of life, as is found
in the schizoid or passive-aggressive per-
sonalities or, on the contrary, the internal
necessity to act on the "pleasure of the
moment" principle as is had in sociopaths,
makes married life impossible. If the mar-
riage does continue, we are advised, it is
often only because both parties are equally
disabled.
A final point I would like to consider is
the incidence of mental illness. If we are
convinced that mental illness does have a
bearing on the contractual ability of a per-
son or on his ability to fulfill the commit-
ments he makes in the marriage contract,
the prevalence of mental illness should
give us some indication of the problems
which face ecclesiastical tribunals today.
To begin the consideration of incidence
of mental disorders, I am sorry to say that
I have been able to find no reliable statis-
tics about the prevalence of the so-called
personality disorders which cause such
havoc with so many marriages.
All I can state in regard to prevalence of
personality disorders is that in the cases of
unsuccessful marriages which have come to
the attention of the Brooklyn Tribunal and
where the parties have been willing to
cooperate in an investigation of the causes
of the failure, especially by psychological
testing, the cause of the failure of the mar-
riage has been found in a "personality
disorder" in approximately two-thirds of
the cases. The cases of personality dis-
orders were twice as numerous as psy-
choses. In almost every action where the
argument was based on a personality dis-
order the plaintiff, or more properly his
attorney, was able to show that the power
of discretion was severely compromised or
that the disorder caused a permanent in-
ability to fulfill the contract. Questioned
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about this, our psychiatrists in unison have
responded that if two mature persons com-
mit themselves in marriage to each other,
they are able to adapt themselves to each
other in reasonable fashion. A psychosis or
a personality disorder normally does not
permit such adaptability.
To the best of my knowledge three
major studies have been conducted on the
prevalence of mental disease. One was
made by the University of Lund in Sweden
and consisted of a person-to-person inter-
view with 2,550 men, women and children
of two rural Swedish parishes.1 4 This study
indicated that psychiatric abnormality was
absent, at the most, in fifty per cent of the
population. Abnormality was evident in
eight to nine per cent, probable in thirteen
to twenty-four per cent, and conceivable
in twenty-six to twenty-eight per cent of
the population. 15 One wonders what the
results would have been if these 2,550 rural
inhabitants would have been willing to
submit to psychological testing rather than
a personal interview.
A second scientific study was made in
Sterling County, a rural area in Canada.
Here it was found that there was almost
certain psychiatric disorders in thirty per
cent of the population. Almost certain
psychiatric disorders were found in twenty-
one per cent of men and forty per cent of
women. Probable psychiatric disorders
were found in another twenty-six per cent
14 Cf. FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN at 1521-22.
Reference is made to Essen-Moller, "Individual
Traits and Morbidity in a Swedish Rural Popula-
tion," ACTA PSYCHIATRICA ET NEUROLOGICA
SCANDINAVICA, Supplementum 100 (1956).
15 Id.
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of the males and in another twenty-five per
cent of the females. Twenty per cent of the
males and fifteen per cent of the females in
Sterling County were found to be almost
certainly free of psychiatric disorder.
16
A third study, known as the "Midtown
Study," was conducted in New York City.
This study indicated that nineteen per cent
of the population had no indication of
psychiatric symptom formation; thirty-six
per cent had mild symptom formation but
were functioning adequately; twenty-two
per cent had moderate symptom formation
with no apparent interference with life ad-
justment; twenty-three per cent in addition
to showing symptoms also showed impair-
ment in life adjustment. Of the twenty-three
per cent who showed psychiatric symptoms
interfering in life adjustment, thirteen per
cent evidenced marked impairment; in
seven per cent the impairment was severe;
in three per cent the impairment was in-
capacitating. 17
There are difficulties in evaluating these
diverse studies. Doctors Dorothea C. Leigh-
ton and Alexander H. Leighton conclude
that between one third and two thirds of
the population studied showed symptoms of
disorders recognizable by psychiatrists.' 8 I
think that from our viewpoint as canonists,
they show severe impairment in at least ten
per cent of the population. The significance
of moderate impairment of behavior on
married life must be left to future studies.
16 Cf. FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN at 1523-25.
Reference is made to A. LEIGHTON, THE CHAR-
ACTER OF DANGER (1963).
17 L. SROLE, MENTAL HEALTH IN THE METROP-
OLIS, THE MIDTOWN MANHATTAN STUDY at 138
(1962).
18 Cf. FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN at 1525.
If we are willing to admit that ten per
cent of the population of our dioceses are
severely impaired in their general behavior,
what are we to conclude as to the effective-
ness of our Tribunals?
As canonists, generally we feel more
secure when we are faced with cases of
schizophrenia. The jurisprudence is clear:
schizophrenia deprives a person of that
power of discretion necessary for marriage;
if schizophrenia is proved before and after
the marriage, it is presumed to be present
at the time of the marriage; a person once
recognized as schizophrenic is presumed
always to be schizophrenic. What is the
prevalence of schizophrenia?
It is conservatively estimated that the
prevalence of schizophrenia is approxi-
mately 150 cases for 100,000 population.
A recent study in Yugoslavia indicated 329
persons afflicted with schizophrenia per
100,000 population. 19
Another study indicates that the chances
that any individual of a given age may be
hospitalized for schizophrenia between
birth and age 75 are 800 to 1,200 per
100,000.20 It must be pointed out that this
estimate of 800 to 1,200 per 100,000 is for
hospitalized cases of schizophrenia. We
are certain that many schizophrenics have
never been and never will be hospitalized.
A highly scientific study of the preval-
ence of mental illness was made recently in
Dublin, Ireland. The study consisted of
gathering and analyzing the data concern-
ing persons admitted to mental hospitals
for the first time during the year 1962.
19 Cf. FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN at 599.
20 Cf. FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN at 600.
Dublin at the time had an approximate
population of 720,000. In 1962, 1,427
persons were admitted for the first time.
Of this number 703 were psychotic, 191
were neurotic, 232 had organic disorders,
253 had personality disorders and 48 had
mental subnormality.2 1 Knowing the ten-
dencies of all hospitals to give a less serious
diagnosis where possible, I personally be-
lieve that the number of psychotics admit-
ted to hospitals for the first time in Dublin
was much higher than 703. Do neurotics
and those who have personality disorders
generally require hospitalization? We must
also consider that many potential patients
are not admitted to hospitals who would
fall into the category of the seriously dis-
turbed.
Considering the number of mentally
disturbed persons, realistically we must ask
ourselves how many of the seriously dis-
turbed are married persons. The Dublin
study shows that one-half of those admitted
to hospitals for mental illness in 1962 were
married.2 2 A fairly logical conclusion would
be that in Dublin where in one year 703
persons were admitted to the hospital for
the first time for psychotic illness, there
would exist at least 350 actionable cases-
on the grounds of psychosis. We say noth-
ing of those neuroses and personality dis-
orders which with future work-ups might
eventually be considered psychoses. Nor
do we consider in these numbers those who
came to the hospital because they were
disturbed but were not admitted, nor those
who never approached a hospital for treat-
21 Cf. FREEDMAN AND KAPLAN at 600.
22 Cf. 115 BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 449-
56 (1969).
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ment because their behavior did not cause
social problems.
What practical conclusions are we to
draw from our considerations? First of all
let us consider the possibility of cases on
the grounds of schizophrenia. If we take a
conservative figure of 150 cases of schizo-
phrenia per 100,000 population, and if we
say that at least one half of these are mar-
ried, do we not have a potential of 75 cases
of nullity per 100,000 population? With
these numbers the Diocese of Brooklyn
with one and one half million catholics
would have a potential of 1,125 cases,
solely on the grounds of schizophrenia. If
we add to these our findings in personality
disorders there would be about 3,375 cases
which warrant hearing. If we accept the
more liberal numbers of about 1,000
schizophrenia per 100,000, and if we con-
sider one half to be married, we would
have in the Diocese of Brooklyn a potential
of 7,500 cases on the grounds of schizo-
phrenia and another 15,000 on the grounds
of personality disorders. If we use the find-
ing that 10 per cent of a population is
seriously disturbed and half of these are
married, are there not potentially in the
Diocese of Brooklyn 75,000 marriage cases.
Of course, these would include addiction,
neuroses, mental subnormality, manic de-
pressive psychoses, etc. These figures
would have to be lowered to some extent
because of the high incidence of mentally
disordered people marrying others with
similar afflictions.
I certainly am not suggesting here a
new Inquisition to separate all couples who
are invalidly married. But I am asking this
question: how often do we as priests try
to keep together people who just cannot
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live together, who have a right to a decree
of nullity and, possibly, to remarriage. We
must also remember that if we try to con-
ciliate parents who in actuality are seriously
disturbed and are unsuited for each other,
the possibility of disturbed children from
such a union is highly increased.
In an interview, Cardinal John Wright,
head of the Vatican's Congregation for the
Clergy, stated that with the new knowledge
of psychiatry and psychology, the Catholic
Church may eventually broaden its attitude
on divorce and remarriage. He added that
with the new knowledge there may be
people who go through a marriage contract
unfit to do so. He concluded that we may
come to see that such marriages were not
valid from the beginning, because of the
immaturity of the people who were mar-
ried, because of their lack of freedom in
any full sense or because of their incapacity
for marriage. 23
I personally believe that the day which
Cardinal Wright foresaw in 1970 has al-
ready arrived. To convince ourselves, we
need only ask our clients to undergo psy-
chological testing in depth. When the re-
sults of these tests are properly interpreted
for us by psychiatric experts, I believe that
the very number of those who deserve relief
from our courts will of necessity force us
to re-think the canonical process of nullity
even in its recently simplified form. The
transcribing of all of the acts, collegiate
tribunals of three judges, long written
23 U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT., Aug. 31, 1970, at
decisions, necessary appeals by the de-
fender of the bond, all these, I am con-
vinced, will have to cease if we are to fulfill
our obligations to recognize and declare
the rights of those who come to us for
relief.
If collegiate tribunals are to remain, and
I believe that in some cases they should,
the opinions of the two associate judges
should be limited to a judgment of the facts.
When an appeal is lodged against a judg-
ment of the court of first instance, the court
of second instance in reviewing the case
should follow the principle of judicial re-
straint. The facts of the case as found by
the trial court should remain unless they
are "clearly erroneous," because the trial
court is in the best position to understand
and to interpret the facts, and to judge the
credibility of the parties and witnesses.2 4
There are certain dangers of abuse or
error in the procedural proposals I have
made. But has there not been error and
abuse for many centuries in forcing people
to remain together in marriage when, in
fact, they humanly could not? The local
bishop, by his own personal and continuous
surveillance and by his appointment of
trained and conscientious judges and de-
fenders of the bond, can correct any errors
and abuses that might arise whether they
be against the interest of the individual or
against the interest of the ecclesial com-
munity.
24 Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 5 2 (g); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95
(1948).
